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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property licensing has grown significantly over the
years with a global market estimated at more than $100 billion.1 In
fact, “intellectual property assets account for 40% of the net value of
all corporations in America.”2 Notwithstanding the likelihood of more
and more licensing transactions, a complex area of the law, patent
licensing has not received much attention in legal journals and
scholarly publications.3 As companies increasingly license and cross∗
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1
Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P. McElwee,
Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE xvii (2d ed. 2005).
2
Id.
3
Rachel Clark Hughey, Licensee by Estoppel, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 53, 54
(2003).
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license technologies, issues arising about the nature and meaning of
license agreements will likely be litigated,4 particularly because
licensing agreements combine matters governed by state contract law
and federal patent law.5
One area of patent licensing not discussed in depth is if a
settlement for patent infringement may ever be considered a patent
license agreement. The legal designation of a patent settlement as a
patent license agreement will have implications for licensees with a
“most favored licensee” status, a legal clause granting deferential
treatment to a licensee in order to prevent a “competitive disadvantage
resulting from more-favorable terms granted to another licensee.”6
Although some courts have decided this issue, they have decided
differently what effect, if any, a patent settlement agreement has on an
existing third party licensee with a “most favored licensee” clause in
the license agreement.7
In Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc.,8 a case
of first impression9, the Seventh Circuit recently held that “[a]
settlement for past infringement entered into after [a patent expires is
not] a license.”10 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
federal appellate courts are divided on whether a settlement agreement
4

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
See Rhone-Poulenc Agro v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1327-28
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
6
Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103
F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1997).
7
See Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, 489 F.2d 974 (7th
Cir. 1973) and Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Novamont Corp., 704 F.2d 48, (2d. Cir.
1983) (each case finding that a patent settlement agreement may not be construed as
a license); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317 (6th
Cir. 1973) and Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Hercules, 105 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(each ruling that a patent settlement agreement may be considered a license).
8
Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo II”), 467 F.
3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
9
For the first time, a court explicitly held that a settlement agreement is not a
license in the context of an expired patent. Other courts, including the Seventh
Circuit, have resolved the issue (albeit differently) in the context of an unexpired
patent, see supra note 7.
10
Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 647 (emphasis added).
5
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entered into before a patent expires constitutes a license.11 The
linchpin in any of the regional appellate court’s reasoning on the issue
boils down its their correct or incorrect understanding of what
essentially a patent license constitutes. For example, what ultimate
effect does a patent license serve and is a license solely prospective in
nature with no retroactive qualities?
Part I of this Note describes the relevant background of patent
law, patent infringement, and patent licenses. Part II explains the
circuit split among the Federal Regional Courts of Appeal, including
the Waterloo decision. Part III of this Note contends that patent
licenses have a unique nature given their purpose, including
retroactive qualities, and that a settlement for past patent infringement,
regardless of whether the patent has expired or not, may constitute a
license, especially when the settlement implicates a “most favored
licensee” clause.12 Part IV of this Note explains the implications of the
Seventh Circuit’s Waterloo decision, especially because of the
increasing importance of patent law and licensing agreements.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Law
A patent grants the patentee13 a right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the patented invention within
the United States, or importing the invention to the United States.14
Frequently the right to exclude is commonly misunderstood. Many

11

Id. at 647 n.1.
Although sometimes referred to as a “most favored nation” clause, see, e.g.,
id. at 643-48, to be more accurate, this Note uses only the phrase “most favored
licensee”.
13
The word patentee as used in this Note has the same meaning as its statutory
definition in 35 U.S.C. § 100 (d) (2000) (“The word ‘patentee’ includes not only the
patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the successors in title to the
patentee”).
14
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
12
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people, including those in the legal profession,15 experts on patent
law,16 and even judges,17 conflate the statutory right to exclude with a
permissive and exclusive right of the patentee to actually make, use, or
sell the patented invention. The resulting confusion is understandable,
however. Over the years, Congress has changed the language of the
statute specifying the rights granted a patentee,18 and it is common for
people to assume that intellectual property ownership, like other types
of property ownership, carries with it the three basic property rights:
the right to use, the right to exclude, and the right to transfer.19
Patent laws have existed since 1790, but Congress enacted the
current patent statute in 1952 under Title 35 of the United States
Code.20 Because a patent grants an exclusive right to the mental
concept of the invention, “a patent protects no single physical
embodiment of an invention as such; rather it controls the abstract
information in the invention, as expressed in the patent’s claims.”21 In

15

For instance, the well-known and generally respected Black’s Law
Dictionary defined the rights a patent grants as “the exclusive right to make, use or
sell an invention for a specified period” in the 7th edition. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1147 (7th ed. 1999). However, the 8th edition defines the rights a
patent grants as the “right to exclude.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (8th ed.
2004).
16
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller & Michael H. Davis, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 11 (1983) (describing the
right a patent grants as “giving the patentee the exclusive right to make, use, or sell
the invention”).
17
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (“The full extent
of the monopoly is the patentee's “exclusive right to make, use, and vend the
invention or discovery”).
18
See Part IIIA1, infra.
19
See Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P.
McElwee, Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5-6 (2d ed. 2005).
20
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (current version at 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-351 (2000).
21
Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P.
McElwee, Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (2d ed. 2005) (citing SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“If structural claims
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exchange for disclosing the patented invention in sufficient detail
within the patent application, the Government grants the patentee a
twenty-year monopoly from the filing date of the patent to exercise
any of the exclusionary rights.22
The monopolistic rights give the patentee the ability to gain
financially from the patent in various ways.23 The patentee may sell
the invention or rights to the invention at monopolistic prices to
recoup any investment costs into research of the patented technology,
or simply to realize a profit.24 The patentee may assign or license all or
some of the patent rights to another in exchange for any price or even
no price at all.25 A patentee may license use of the patented technology
to another in exchange for royalties, rights to use another patented
technology (cross-licensing agreements), or for just about anything
that the parties agree upon.26 In short, a patent grants rights similar in
function to holders of tangible property27—except the right to use.28

were to be limited to devices operated precisely as a specification-described
embodiment is operated, there would be no need for claims”).
22
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
23
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons For Patent Policy From
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2005)
(discussing three main sources of profits derived from patents: (1) excluding
competitors, (2) forcing competitors to accept licenses, (3) strategically using patents
to avoid litigation such as using patents to facilitate cross-licensing and opportunistic
and anticompetitive patent suits based on weak or invalid patents).
24
See, e.g., Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24,
36-37 (1923) ( “[T]he government is not granting the common-law right to make,
use and vend, but it is granting the incident of exclusive ownership of that commonlaw right, which [cannot] be enjoyed save with the common-law right” and that “a
patent confers a monopoly”); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d
614 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting that a patent holder does not misuse a patent when the
patentee demands an exorbitant royalty rate, essentially refusing to do business with
the willful infringer).
25
Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1891).
26
See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 23, at 9-10.
27
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
28
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000); see also Part IIIA1, infra.
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B. Patent Infringement
Patent infringement occurs when “[anyone] without authority
makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent thereof.”29 A patent term begins the day
the patent issues and ends twenty years from the filing date of the
patent application.30 An entity may infringe a patent in three ways:
direct infringement, contributory infringement, and induced
infringement.31
The remedy for patent infringement may include injunctions,32
monetary damages (including treble damages),33 and even attorney’s
fees34 in warranted cases. By statute, the court awards monetary
damages adequate to compensate for infringing the patented
invention.35 A court may calculate adequate compensation based on
the patentee’s lost profits due to the infringing activities of the
infringer.36
Furthermore, statutory law mandates a minimum amount of
damages awarded to the patentee.37 A court calculates the “floor”
award for patent infringement damage based on “a reasonable royalty
for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”38 However,
statutory law also places temporal limits on the amount of damages
sought by the patentee.39 35 U.S.C. § 286 confines collecting damages
to six years “prior to the filing” of an infringement claim.40

29

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
31
35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2000).
32
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
33
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
34
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
35
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
36
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir.
1978).
37
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
38
Id.
39
35. U.S.C. § 286 (2000).
40
Id.
30
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Lastly, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in cases involving issues of patent law.41 The
Federal Circuit is a court of Federal Appeals especially created to hear,
among other things, patent cases appealed from Federal District Courts
and, as such, has no geographic limitations within the United States
and its territories.42 Thus, substantive patent law comes substantially
from the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court.43 Although after
Holmes Group Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,44 other federal
appellate courts may decide substantive patent law issues when a
compulsory counterclaim pleads substantive patent law issues, even
though the complaint does not assert any claim arising under the
patent laws of the United States.45
C. Licensing
The owner of a patent may grant licenses to others.46 Since the
patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale or selling, or importing the invention,47 no one else may
engage in any of these acts without the patentee’s permission without
risking liability for infringement.48 While federal statutory and case
law governs substantive patent law, state laws govern interpretation of
license agreements due to their contractual nature.49 However, where
41

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final
decision of a district court of the United States . . . based, in whole or in part, on
section 1338 of this title”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (“The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents”).
42
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000).
43
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
44
535 U.S. 826 (2002)
45
Holmes Group Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 830
(2002).
46
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
47
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
48
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
49
See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A., v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323,
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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state contract law yields inconsistent results with federal patent policy,
federal patent law governs.50
Patent license agreements may be exclusive, partially exclusive,
or nonexclusive.51 A license “[i]n its simplest form . . . means only
leave to do a thing which the licensor otherwise would have a right to
prevent.”52 Thus, a patent license agreement is in essence nothing
more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee,53 though
an exclusive license agreement may also grant the licensee the right to
sue other infringers.54
A patentee may limit the license agreement by geography, by
duration, or by invention scope.55 A license may grant unrestricted or
limited use in a particular field.56 For example, a patentee may limit a
license agreement for a patented veterinary drug to only dogs in
California for two years but not other animals in other states.
Generally, the license agreement may include whatever provisions the
50

In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lear v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969)) (“The construction of a patent license is generally a
matter of state contract law, except where state law ‘would be inconsistent with the
aims of federal patent policy’”).
51
Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853, 855 (6th Cir. 1933).
52
W. Elec. Co., Inc. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp. 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir.
1930).
53
Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., 109 F.3d 1567, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
54
See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1053 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (Lourie, J. additional remarks) (“A patent license, if it is non-exclusive, is an
agreement to forbear from suit. If the license is exclusive, it may be tantamount to an
assignment of the patent”); see also Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision
of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“An exclusive licensee receives
more substantial rights in a patent than a nonexclusive licensee, but receives fewer
rights than an assignee of all substantial patent rights”).
55
See Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert &
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“In any event, patent license agreements can be written to convey different scopes
of promises not to sue, e.g., a promise not to sue under a specific patent or, more
broadly, a promise not to sue under any patent the licensor now has or may acquire
in the future”); see also Intellectual Prop. Dev., 248 F.3d at 1345 (“[A]n exclusive
licensee could receive the exclusive right to practice an invention within a given
limited territory”).
56
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 181 (1938).
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parties agree upon, such as the payment of royalties, duration of the
agreement, exclusive or non-exclusive terms, and permitted uses—for
example, selling but not making.57
A license is a contract,58 and may be written or oral,59 express60 or
implied.61 The terms and conditions of the license must be consistent
with the scope of the patent.62 No particular form of license is
required.63 A license may also explicitly include a release from past
infringement,64 though the agreement itself releases the infringer from
any rights of the patentee to exclude the infringer from using the
patented invention.65
License agreements may also include a “Most Favored Licensee”
(MFL) or “Most Favored Nation” clause. A MFL clause protects the
licensee from “a competitive disadvantage resulting from morefavorable terms granted to another licensee.”66 MFL status assures the
licensee that it will not pay more in royalties than another licensee,
and usually that the licensor will inform the licensee of any other
57

Id. at 127 (quoting United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489
(1926)) (“[T]he patentee may grant a license ‘upon any condition the performance of
which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent
is entitled to secure’”).
58
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 136970 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
59
De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927).
60
Michael J. Swope, Comment, Recent Developments in Patent Law: Implied
License – An Emerging Threat to Contributory Infringement Protection, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 281 (1995) (“An express license operates by written or oral contract between
the patent owner and the purchaser of the product”).
61
Hughey, supra note 3, at 55-56.
62
Id.
63
De Forest Radio Tel. Co., 273 U.S. at 241.
64
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 297 (1948) (“By accepting
[the license agreements,] they secured release from claims for past infringement
through a provision to that effect in the license”).
65
Id. at 343 (“[The] nonexclusive license agreement . . . served only to release
the licensee from the right of the patent holder to exclude him from making, using or
selling a patented article”); see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 168
(1931).
66
Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103
F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1997).
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licensees and the terms of their agreements.67 Essentially, MFL clauses
suggest that licensed competitors should be treated equally, so long as
they bear equivalent obligations to the licensor/patentee.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND WATERLOO
Four federal courts of appeal have decided the issue of whether a
settlement agreement for patent infringement may constitute a license
for an unexpired patent: the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Federal
Circuits.68 The Second and Seventh circuits decided the issue
differently than the Sixth and Federal circuits, and thus their decisions
differ in the effect a patent settlement agreement has on an existing
third party licensee with a “most favored licensee” clause in the
license agreement.69
The Seventh Circuit in the Waterloo decision, however, is the only
appellate court to decide the issue in the context of an expired patent.
A review of the reasoning justifying the holdings of the other federal
regional appellate courts in the context of an unexpired patent will
help define the split among the circuits and illuminate how that split
influenced the Seventh Circuit’s Waterloo decision. First, this Note
will explain the circuit split, beginning with the Second and Seventh
circuits, followed by the Sixth and Federal Circuits. Finally, this Note
will explain the relevant details and reasoning of the Seventh Circuit’s
Waterloo decision.

67

See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Hercules, Inc., 105 F.3d 629,
633 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that the licensor's obligation was to notify the licensee
of the terms and conditions of any other license agreements, not simply “more
favorable” license agreements in the licensors opinion).
68
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Novamont Corp., 704 F.2d 48, (2d. Cir. 1983);
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1973);
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, 489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973);
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Hercules, 105 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
69
See Ransburg, 489 F.2d 974 and Novamont, 704 F.2d 48 (each case finding
that a patent settlement agreement may not be construed as a license); Shatterproof
Glass, 482 F.2d 317 and Hercules, 105 F.3d 629 (each ruling that a patent settlement
agreement may be considered a license).
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A. Other Federal Courts of Appeal Decisions
1. According to the Second and Seventh Circuits, a settlement
agreement is not a license before a patent expires.
Two federal appellate circuits have held that a settlement
agreement entered into before a patent expires is not a license
agreement: the Second Circuit in Studiengesellschaft Kohle v.
Novamont Corp.70 and the Seventh Circuit in Ransburg ElectroCoating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller.71 Because this Note focuses on the
Waterloo decision, only a cursory overview of the reasoning and any
pertinent facts in the cases will be given, beginning with the Second
Circuit decision in Novamont Corp.
In Novamont Corp., the court held that a settlement agreement for
past infringement did not implicate the MFL status of a licensee.72 The
court considered the “treatment of an earlier licensee, who was entitled
to a MFL clause and a competitor who took a license later, after a
period of infringing activity.”73 The licensor granted a license to
Novamont in 1967 to produce certain polymers of propylene.74 The
license included a “Most Favored Licensee” (MFL) clause requiring
the licensor to “promptly furnish Novamont with the full text of any
licenses granted under the [patent], if . . . considered in their entirety,
the licenses were more favorable than those in the licensee agreement
[with Novamont].”75
Later, the licensor granted a third-party competitor a license but
did not promptly inform Novamont about the new agreement.76 When
the licensor finally did inform Novamont of the agreement, the
licensor did not include in the notification a particular clause within

70

704 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1983).
489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973).
72
Novamont, 704 F.2d at 52.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 50.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 51-52
71
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the agreement.77 The clause in the agreement released the third-party
competitor from past infringement pending the outcome of another
infringement case and permitted the third-party competitor to credit
any money the licensor recovered from the third-party competitor for
past infringement against royalties the third-party competitor owed the
licensor.78
In other words, the third-party competitor would pay the licensor
royalties for past infringement that would count towards the future
royalties the third-party competitor owed the licensor under the license
agreement, a two-birds-for-one-stone-type agreement. After Novamont
learned of the undisclosed clause, they requested the same treatment,
believing that the clause permitted the third-party competitor to pay a
reduced royalty because the royalty covered both past and future
infringing use of the patented technology.79
The Second Circuit disagreed that the clause settling past
infringement implicated Novamont’s MFL status for two reasons.80
First, Novamont could not have benefited from the second license
agreement because Novamont had not been an infringer at the time the
third-party competitor and the licensor reached the second
agreement.81
Second, granting Novamont the benefit of the second license
agreement terms would require the licensor to insist upon a payment
for past infringement from the third-party competitor equal to the
“royalty terms governing [Novamont] during the same period, or [the
licensor] must make a refund to [Novamont].”82 Ultimately, the court
decided that MFL clauses do not require such a high “degree of
equivalency” and courts “have declined to interpret the clauses with
that breadth.”83 The court declined to discuss in any detail the
prospective or retroactive qualities of a patent license agreement,
77

Id. at 51-52
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 52.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
78
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briefly acknowledging that the Sixth Circuit’s earlier reasoning in
Shatterproof Glass did not persuade them.84
Next, this Note will review the Seventh Circuit’s Ransburg
decision, holding that a patent license agreement is prospective in
nature and not equivalent to a release for past infringement.85 In
Ransburg, an accused infringer settled a patent infringement suit by
making monthly installments to compensate the patentee.86 Later, in a
separate infringement action, a court held the patent invalid.87 The
infringer subsequently ceased making payments under the terms of the
settlement agreement.88 The patentee sued the accused infringer to
recover the remaining amount owed under the settlement agreement.89
The Seventh Circuit rejected the infringer’s arguments that the
settlement agreement was a retroactive licensing agreement and that
because the patent was now invalid, the infringer no longer had to pay
the patentee as obligated by the earlier settlement agreement.90
To require the infringer to continue payment of the settlement
agreement would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s policy of
“ridding the public of invalid patents thereby dedicating ideas to the
common good,” or so the infringer argued.91 The court disagreed with
the infringer, reasoning that a patent license has only a prospective
quality, negating any possible retroactive effects of a patent license.92
Thus, a patent license is not equivalent to a release for past
wrongdoing (a settlement agreement).93 Moreover, the court listed the
public policy reasons for continuing to enforce a settlement agreement

84

Id. at 52 n.5.
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, 489 F.2d 974, 977-78
(7th Cir. 1973).
86
Id. at 976.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 977.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 977-78.
93
Id.
85
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for infringement of a patent, even though the patent was subsequently
found invalid.94
2. According to the Sixth and Federal Circuits, a settlement agreement
may be a license before a patent expires.
In contrast to Novamont and Ransburg, two other federal appellate
circuits have held that a settlement agreement entered into before a
patent expires is a license agreement: the Sixth Circuit in Shatterproof
Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.95 and the Federal Circuit in
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Hercules.96 Again, only a cursory
overview of the reasoning and any pertinent facts in the cases will be
given, beginning with the Sixth Circuit decision in Shatterproof Glass.
The Shatterproof Glass case, in which the Sixth circuit held that a
patent settlement agreement may constitute a license for purposes of a
MFL clause,97 entails a few unique facts. Shatterproof Glass, a second
licensee, entered into a licensing agreement with a licensor in 1955.98
The licensing agreement included a MFL clause that covered not only
future licenses but also already existing licenses with other third
parties.99
The first licensee had originally entered a licensing agreement in
1931.100 Later, the first licensee entered into another agreement in
1961 for a release of infringement prior to 1961 of certain patents and
a paid-up license under another patent in exchange for lump sum
payments.101 The license agreement also included a royalty rate for
future use of other patents.102
The licensor failed to notify Shatterproof Glass of the more
favorable terms found in the 1931 and 1961 agreements, in violation
94

Id. at 977-78.
482 F.2d 317 (6th 1973).
96
105 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
97
Shatterproof Glass, 482 F.2d at 321.
98
Id. at 318.
99
Id. at 318 n.1.
100
Id. at 319.
101
Id.
102
Id.
95
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of the MFL clause.103 Shatterproof Glass sought to recover royalties
already paid in excess of the more favorable rates the first licensee had
paid.104
Shatterproof Glass argued that the “nature of the [agreements]”
and not their label is controlling, and “that properly construed, the
document is a retroactive license.”105 The Sixth Circuit agreed,
reasoning that “a release can, in certain circumstances, have the effect
of and be construed as a license.”106 Additionally the court recognized
that a patent license is “a mere waiver of the right to sue by the
patentee.”107 Moreover, the agreement that released the first licensee
from any claims of infringement “was in effect a settlement by
payment of just compensation for previous use of the patent . . .
[otherwise] evasion of a ‘favored [licensee]’ clause [would be]
possible.”108
Turning now to the Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., v. Hercules,
Inc. case,109 the Federal Circuit held that a MFL licensee was entitled
to the same terms as a settlement for past infringement by a third-party
competitor.110 In Hercules, a licensor, failed to notify a MFL licensee,
Hercules, of another license agreement with a third-party competitor,
in violation of the MFL clause.111 Meanwhile, Hercules had stopped
paying royalties during a six-year period, triggering the licensor to
commence a patent infringement lawsuit against Hercules.112
After Hercules discovered the third-party competitor license
agreement with more favorable royalty rates and a release for past
infringement, Hercules requested a retroactive license with royalty
rates similar to the third-party competitor license agreement, reaching
103

Id. at 319-20.
Id.
105
Id. at 320.
106
Id. (citing De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241-42
(1927)).
107
Shatterproof Glass, 482 F.2d at 320.
108
Id. at 321.
109
105 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
110
Id. at 634.
111
Id. at 631-32.
112
Id. at 632.
104

810
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

15

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 13

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

back to the date any allegedly infringing activities began, “thereby
insulating itself from any infringement claim.” 113
The Federal Circuit observed that “absolving six years of
infringement via a retroactive license [was] troubling” because it was
uncertain if Hercules would have accepted a similar agreement had the
licensor offered Hercules the same terms as the third-party competitor
license agreement within the timeframe required by the MFL clause.114
Nevertheless, because the licensor breached the MFL clause by not
notifying Hercules of the third-party competitor license agreement
within the required timeframe, the uncertainty was the licensor’s to
bear.115
The Federal Circuit ruled that “Hercules [was] entitled to the
terms of the [third-party competitor] license effective May 1980, when
the [third-party competitor] license became effective.”116 Notably, the
Federal Circuit did not dwell on the prospective-retroactive potential
dualism of a patent license as did the Seventh117 and Sixth118 circuits.
Instead, the court apparently accepted the possibility of a retroactive
license as a concept requiring little to no justification, almost as if the
concept itself was self-evident.119 The uncertain actions of the parties
caused the Federal Circuit some hesitancy with its decision but not the
concept of a retroactive license itself.120
The Sixth and Seventh Circuit courts extensively discussed their
rationale for why they decided a settlement agreement or release from
past infringement may or may not be considered a patent license,
emphasizing the retroactive, or alternatively, the sole prospective

113

Id. at 634.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, 489 F.2d 974, 977 (7th
Cir. 1973).
118
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th
1973).
119
See id.
120
See id.
114
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quality of patent licenses.121 The Seventh Circuit in Waterloo was no
different.
B. The Waterloo Case
The Seventh Circuit is the only court to address whether
settlement agreements for past infringement may constitute a patent
license even though the patent has expired. In Waterloo, the Seventh
Circuit held that “[a] settlement for past infringement entered into
after [a patent expires is not] a license.”122 Additionally, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that federal appellate courts are divided on
whether a settlement agreement entered into before a patent expires
constitutes a license.123 As will be discussed in greater detail below,124
the linchpin in Seventh Circuit’s reasoning boils down to their correct
or incorrect understanding of what essentially a patent license
constitutes.
Waterloo manufactures keyboard support devices.125 Haworth
owned Patent No. 4,616,798 (the ‘798 patent) for a computer keyboard
adjustable support, which attaches to the underside of a desk.126 In
December 1992, Waterloo and Haworth entered into a licensing
agreement to resolve an infringement claim Haworth brought against
Waterloo.127 Although the parties executed the agreement in December
1992, it retroactively covered Waterloo’s past infringement that
occurred before December 1992.128
The agreement included a MFL clause wherein Haworth promised
to automatically offer Waterloo a more favorable royalty rate if
121

See, e.g., Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 489 F.2d at 977; Shatterproof
Glass Corp., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th 1973).
122
Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo II”), 467
F. 3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
123
Id. at 647 n.1.
124
See Part III, infra.
125
Id. at 643.
126
Id. at 644.
127
Id.
128
Waterloo Furniture Components v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo I”), 402 F.
Supp. 2d 950, 952 (N.D. Ill 2005), aff’d, Waterloo II, 467 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Haworth licensed the ‘798 patent to a third party at a more favorable
rate.129 The license agreement also included the express intention of
the parties, namely that “Waterloo is treated no less favorably than
direct competitors of Waterloo in regard to licensing of the ‘798
patent.” 130 Moreover, Haworth promised to provide written notice to
Waterloo of any subsequent third party license agreement and its terms
within thirty days following the license agreement’s execution.131
Michigan law governed the agreement.132
In 1997, a third party, SoftView, filed a declaratory judgment
action against Haworth, arguing that SoftView was not infringing the
‘798 patent.133 Haworth filed a counterclaim in June 1998 that
SoftView had infringed the ‘798 patent.134 On December 9, 2003, after
five and half years of litigation, the parties reached an agreement in
principle to settle the case. 135 A formal settlement was executed on
March 24, 2004.136 Meanwhile, the ‘798 patent expired on October 14,
2003.137
Waterloo learned about the settlement agreement and requested a
copy from Haworth.138 Haworth responded that its agreement with
SoftView was confidential.139 Waterloo filed a breach of contract claim
in the Northern District of Illinois because it suspected that its
licensor, Haworth, had entered into a settlement agreement that offered
an infringing competitor more favorable royalty terms than the terms
of Waterloo’s own license.140

129

Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 644.
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 643.
138
Id. at 644.
139
Id.
140
Waterloo Furniture Components v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo I”), 402 F.
Supp. 2d 950, 951 (N.D. Ill 2005).
130
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Haworth moved for summary judgment, and Waterloo served
discovery requests, including a request to see the SoftView/Haworth
settlement agreement.141 The district court halted discovery sua sponte
and granted Haworth’s summary judgment motion after allowing the
parties to submit briefs on the summary judgment motion.142
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment,
holding that “a settlement for past infringement entered into after [a]
patent’s expiration [does not] constitute a license.”143 The court
reasoned that a license is only prospective in nature because a patent
license grants a licensee a future right to make or use the patented
invention.144
In affirming the district court’s judgment, the Seventh Circuit
went beyond what was necessary to adjudicate the case. The district
court merely found that the license agreement between Waterloo and
Haworth expired, and as a result, neither party had any obligations to
each other at the time Haworth and SoftView entered into a settlement
agreement.145
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s interpretation
of the Haworth/Waterloo agreement, at which point the adjudication
could have ended.146 But then the court went on to hold that a
settlement agreement may not be considered a license agreement after
the patent expired (even if the Haworth/Waterloo agreement was still
in force at the time Haworth and SoftView executed their settlement
agreement) thus still negating Waterloo’s breach of contract claims.147

141

Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 644.
Waterloo I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 953. Although the district court held that the
licensing agreement terminated with the patent’s expiration, Waterloo I, 402 F.
Supp. 2d at 953, to which the Seventh Circuit agreed, Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 64546, whether the contract’s terms were correctly interpreted by the Federal Courts is
beyond the scope of this Note.
143
Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 647.
144
Id.
145
Waterloo I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
146
Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 645-47.
147
Id.
142
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISSTEPS
The Seventh Circuit made several missteps in the Waterloo case.
First, it made incorrect assumptions about the nature of a patent
license. The Seventh Circuit incorrectly defined what constitutes a
patent law license, oddly relying in part on a 1951 edition of Black’s
Law Dictionary.148 Moreover, because the court began with the wrong
definition of a patent license, the court then incorrectly deemed that
licenses may only be prospective in nature.149 The court then bolstered
these assumptions by implying that an expired patent retains no value
to the patentee, and thus a patent license may only be prospective in
nature.150 In reality, the first misstep combines a series of flawed
missteps.
Second, the court arguably ignored the Supreme Court’s analysis
of the legal effects of a patent license and should have been more
deferential to the Federal Circuit,151 the court Congress especially
created to determine patent issues and bring uniformity to patent
laws.152
Third and finally, not only did the Seventh Circuit make wrong
assumptions in its reasoning, but also it ignored the actual negotiation
process and result of both a licensing agreement and a settlement
agreement for patent infringement. Instead, the Seventh Circuit
focused on the labels given to a document ending disputes negotiated
under threat of litigation or actual litigation and not its substance.
A. Incorrect Assumptions Made About the Nature of Licenses
The first misstep actually involves a series of flawed missteps.
The Seventh Circuit made three incorrect primary assumptions about
148

Id.
Id.
150
Id. at 641.
151
See Part IIIB, infra.
152
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838
(2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit “was created, in part, to promote uniformity
in the development [patent] law”).
149
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the nature of a patent license and patents in general. The court began
with a wrong definition of a patent license,153 and then the court relied
on that definition in deciding that patent licenses have only
prospective qualities.154 Finally, the court bolstered the prospective
quality of a patent license with the mistaken implication that an
expired patent no longer has value.155 Before we detail the series of
missteps and why they are flawed, however, this Note will detail the
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Waterloo.
Broken down, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Waterloo follows
these steps. First, a patent license grants a licensee a permissive right
to use the patented invention.156 Because a patent license grants the
licensee a permissive, future right to use the patented invention, a
patent license can only be prospective in nature.157 Furthermore,
because a patent license is prospective in nature, a patentee may not
license a patent after its expiration; indeed “there is nothing left for the
patent holder to license.” 158 Thus, a settlement entered into after a
patent’s expiration is not a license.159
Implied in this reasoning is that a settlement may be both
prospective and retrospective in nature, i.e. a settlement agreement
may release the infringer from past tortious acts in addition to any
future ones that may occur. The Seventh Circuit also reinforced its
decision by implying that an expired patent no longer has value or may
be sued upon.160
The mistakes made in the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning flow from
their beginning assumptions, namely that a license grants permissive
rights and is only prospective in nature.161 By starting on the wrong
foot, the Seventh Circuit ended up in the wrong place.
153

Waterloo II, 467 F.3d at 647.
Id.
155
Id. at 647-48.
156
Id. at 647.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 647-48.
159
Id. at 647.
160
Id.
161
Id.
154
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1. A patent license is in essence a promise not to sue the licensee, not a
grant to the licensee of rights to use the patented invention.
The Seventh Circuit started off on the wrong foot. First, the
Seventh Circuit mistakenly understood a license as a “written
authority granted by the owner of a patent to another person
empowering the latter to make or use the patented article for a limited
period or in a limited territory.”162 Surprisingly, and somewhat oddly,
the Seventh Circuit relied on the fourth edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary, published in 1951, as its quoted authority on what a patent
license constitutes.163
Why seek a definition of a patent license from an out-of-date,
albeit generally respected, legal dictionary instead of precedent from
the Federal Circuit? Even better, why not consult Supreme Court
precedent on the meaning of a license in the context of patent law? As
will be shown, both types of precedential and persuasive authority
were amply available for the Seventh Circuit’s choosing.164
Before reviewing various Federal Circuit definitions of a patent
license, a short review of the rights conferred by a patent is in order.
Only after a correct understanding of the property rights a patent
grants a patentee can a proper understanding of the rights a patent
license grants a licensee be reached.
By statute, a patent grants the patentee “the right to exclude others
from making, using, selling, or offering to sell” the patented invention
within the United States.165 However, the exact contours of this right
were not always unmistakably comprehended because of ambiguities
in the statute language prior to 1952.166 In the 1946 Patent Act for
example,167 Congress established that a patent granted the patentee
162

Id.
Id.
164
See Part IIIB, infra.
165
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
166
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West
1954), reprinted in 75 J. PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE SOCIETY 161, 201 (1993)
(“The exact rights conferred by a patent were difficult to understand and explain
under the [pre-1952] language”).
167
Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946).
163
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“the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention . . .
throughout the United States.”168 This older version of the Patent Act
may help explain the erroneous definition of a patent law license
found in the 1951 fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary169 and
subsequently relied upon by the Seventh Circuit.170 As will be
discussed in greater detail below, the phrase “exclusive right to [use]”
created an ambiguity in the understanding of the rights conferred by a
patent.
After 1951, Congress enacted the current Patent Act in 1952,
revising the statutory language describing the rights a patent
confers.171 The current statute utilizes the same relevant language from
the 1952 Patent Act with some minor additions.172 At present, a patent
grants the patentee “the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention.”173 In relevant part,
Congress omitted the word “exclusive” from the 1942 Patent Act and
added the words “exclude others from” in the 1952 Patent Act,174
clarifying the tenor of rights a patent grants a patentee to conform with
existing law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.175
Although the 1952 Patent Act revised the language describing the
rights conferred by a patent to render the meaning clearer, the
Supreme Court has concluded on numerous occasions that a patent

168

35 U.S.C. § 40 (1946).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (4th ed. 1951).
170
Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc. (“Waterloo II”), 467
F. 3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2006).
171
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States”).
172
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (adding the phrase “offering for sale”).
173
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
174
Id. Congress also added the phrase “offering for sale” sometime after the
1952 Patent Act.
175
S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2417
(“The wording of the granting clause is changed to ‘the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling’, following language used by the Supreme Court, to render
the meaning clearer”) (emphasis added).
169
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confers the right to exclude others from using176 the invention.177 At
other times, the Court has declared that a patent grants the patentee the
right to use the invention.178 The perhaps seemingly inconsistent views
of the Court are explained below.
In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,179 the
Court extensively discussed the rights granted a patentee and the
theories supporting those rights.180 The Court endorsed the view that a
common law understanding of property already granted the patentee a
right to use his invention,181 and that the only right Congress granted

176

For the reader’s sake, the terms “use” or “using,” in the context of rights
granted a patentee here and throughout this Note, include the statutory rights of
making, using, selling and offering to sell when not explicitly listed.
177
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1853) (“The franchise which the
patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making,
using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is
all [the patentee] obtains by the patent”); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States,
258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922) (citing Bloomer, 55 U.S. 539) (“From an early day it has
been held by this court that the franchise secured by a patent consists only in the
right to exclude others from making, using, or vending the thing patented without the
permission of the patentee”); see also United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287, 316 (1948) (Douglas, J. concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 8) (“It
is to be noted first that all that is secured to inventors is ‘the exclusive right’ to their
inventions”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. et al., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)
(Patent laws promote progress of science and useful arts “by offering a right of
exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors”).
178
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (“The full
extent of the monopoly is the patentee's ‘exclusive right to make, use, and vend the
invention or discovery’”).
179
210 U.S. 405 (1908).
180
Id. at 423-25.
181
Id. at 424-25 (“[The patentee] receives nothing from the law that he did not
have before”); accord Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (“The right
to make, use and sell an invented article is not derived from the patent law. This
right existed before and without the passage of the law and was always the right of
an inventor”); Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 3435 (1923) (“[This] Court held that the Government did not confer on the patentee the
right himself to make, use or vend his own invention, that such right was a right
under the common law not arising under the federal patent laws and not within the
grant of power to Congress to enact such laws”).
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by statute was the exclusive right to use the invention,182 which the
Court interpreted as the right to exclude others from using the
invention.183
In summary, Congress never conferred by patent the statutory
right to use the invention although the language used to describe the
rights conferred by patent may have been misunderstood as conferring
a “right to use” in the 1942 Patent Act and all previous versions of the
Patent Act.184 Rather, Congress only intended the statutory language to
182

Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 423-25 (“Congress has . . . guaranteed
[the patentee] an exclusive right to [his invention] for a limited time”); accord
Bauer, 229 U.S. at 10 (“The [Patent Act] secured to the inventor the exclusive right
to make, use and vend the thing patented”); see Crown Die, 261 U.S. at 34-35.
183
Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 423-25 (“[T]he only effect of the patent
is to restrain others from manufacturing and using that which he has invented”);
accord Bauer, 229 U.S. at 10 (The Patent Act consequently, “secured to the inventor
the exclusive right . . . to prevent others from [using the patented invention] without
the consent of the patentee”); Crown Die, 261 U.S. at 34-35 (“[This] Court further
held that in its essence all that the Government conferred by the patent was the right
to exclude others from making, using or vending his invention”).
184
The previous Patent Acts used some form of the phrase “right to use the
invention,” albeit with different wording over the years. The Supreme Court
summarized the historical changes in the language used to describe the rights
conferred by patent in the relevant statutes for the Patent Acts of 1790, 1793, 1736,
and 1870 as follows:
The protection given to inventors and authors in the United States
originated in the Constitution, § 8 of Art. I of which authorizes the
Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” This protection,
so far as inventors are concerned, has been conferred by an act of
Congress passed April 10, 1790, and subsequent acts and
amendments. The act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, c. 7, granted “the sole
and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and
vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery.” In
1793 (Feb. 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318, c. 11) the word “full” was
substituted for the word “sole,” and in 1836 (July 4, 1836, 5 Stat.
117, § 5, c. 357) the word “constructing” was omitted. This
legislation culminated in § 4884 of the Revised Statutes, the part
with which we are dealing being practically identical with the act
of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, § 22, c. 230. It provides that every
patent shall contain “a grant to the patentee, his heirs and assigns,
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grant the property right to exclude others from using the invention.185
In other words, even though the statutory language in the Patent Acts
before 1952 used the phrase “exclusive right to use” in describing the
rights conferred by patent, Supreme Court cases interpreted that phrase
to mean that a patent only grants the patentee the right to exclude
others from using the patented invention.186 To be sure, all forms of
intellectual property share the essential right to exclude others from
using, without permission, the copyright, patent, trademark, or trade
secret.187
Despite the statutory definition of what rights a patent grants a
patentee, it is still common to perceive a patent’s grant as a de facto
monopoly for the patentee to make, use, and sell the invention, and
with it the ability to license those same rights to a licensee.188
Common experience with tangible personal or real property may make
it difficult for many people to conceive of a right to exclude without
simultaneously having the right to use tangible property.189 However,
because intellectual property is intangible, the concept of having only
the right to exclude and not the right to use becomes troublesome for
for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use,
and vend the invention or discovery.
Bauer, 229 U.S. at 9-10.
185
See Richardson v. Suzuki, 868 F2d. 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The right
to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property”).
186
See, e.g., Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945) (“The patent
grant is not of a right to the patentee to use the invention, for that he already
possesses. It is a grant of the right to exclude others from using it. As the statute, R.
S. § 4884, provides, the grant is of the “exclusive right to make, use, and vend” the
invention”).
187
Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P.
McElwee, Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (2d ed. 2005) (“The direct impact of
intellectual property is entirely negative: it prevents those who do not own it form
doing things they otherwise might lawfully and productively do, normally without
invading any ones’ tangible property”).
188
See Part IA, supra.
189
Kenneth L. Port, Jay Dratler, Jr., Faye M. Hammersley, Terence P.
McElwee, Charles R. McManis & Barbara A. Wrigley, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5-6 (2d ed. 2005).
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many. An example of why this distinction is important will help
illuminate the concept, and explain how the distinction affects
licensing agreements.
Suppose inventor Jon holds a patent for a widget with elements
A+B+C and inventor Kate holds a patent for a widget with elements
A+B. Despite Jon’s patent, Kate may still exclude Jon from making,
using, or selling his widget with elements A+B+C, because it would
infringe Kate’s patent for a widget with elements A+B. Kate’s patent
claim would read on Jon’s widget.190 Inventor Kate owns a
“dominating” patent.191
The following drawing helps to visualize this situation where
Jon’s patent for a widget with elements A+B+C is the inner circle, and
Kate’s patent for a widget with elements A+B is the outer circle
encompassing Jon’s inner circle. The drawing represents how Kate’s
“dominate” patent prevents Jon from freely using his invention; Kate
has the right to exclude Jon from using any widget that includes
elements A+B. Even though the law grants Jon the right to exclude
others from using his invention, he himself does not have the right to
use his invention without Kate’s consent.

A+B
A+B+C

190

“Read on” is a term of art in patent litigation. See 8 Donald S. Chisum,
CHISUM ON PATENTS Glossary (2001) (Explaining meaning of the term “reads on” as
“a claim ‘reads on’ or covers products or processes that contain all of the elements
and limitations of the claim”).
191
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (8th ed. 2004) on blocking patent,
dominating patent, and fencing patent.
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A similar situation, often referred to as a “blocking patent,”192
would arise if Jon instead held a patent for a widget with elements
A+C, yet Jon makes, uses, and sells a widget with elements A+B+C.
In that case, both Jon and Kate could prevent each other from making,
using, or selling a widget with elements A+B+C. This is because Jon’s
patent claim including elements A+B and Kate’s patent claim
including elements A+C would read on the widget with elements
A+B+C, each patent “blocking” the other’s use of the widget.193
The following drawing helps to visualize this situation, where
Jon’s patent for a widget with elements A+C is the right circle, and
Kate’s patent for a widget with elements A+B is the left circle. The
overlapping area of the two circles represents the overlapping patent
rights that Kate and Jon share. The drawing represents how Kate and
Jon’s patents “block” each other from freely using their inventions
without the other’s consent.
Kate has the right to exclude Jon from using any widget that
includes elements A+B and Jon has the right to exclude Kate from
using any widget that includes elements A+C. Even though the law
grants Jon and Kate the right to exclude others from using their
respective inventions, neither Jon nor Kate has the right to use their
invention without the other’s consent. Cross-licensing the patents
would permit both Jon and Kate to make, use, and sell the widget
A+B+C.194

A+B

A+C
A+B+C

192

Id.
Id.
194
Id.
193
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The previous hypotheticals are not mere mental gymnastics to
illuminate theories of patent law, but they occur in actual court cases,
and affect their outcomes.195 Why is the distinction between the right
to use and the right to exclude important? It is important because
understanding what rights a patent grants a patentee shapes what rights
a licensee receives from the patentee, and thus what a patent license
constitutes.
Notwithstanding the actual language of a license agreement, a
patent license is not a grant of rights to the licensee to use the
invention; rather, a patent license is an agreement that the licensor will
not sue the licensee, so long as neither party breaches the
agreement.196 According to the Supreme Court, a patent license
“amounts to no more than ‘a mere waiver of the right to sue.’”197 The
federal courts of appeal have also declared that a patent license is
nothing more than a promise not to sue.198 In fact, a patentee has no
other obligations to the licensee,199 even to the point that a patentee
does not have to sue other infringers of the licensed patent.200 Neither
195

United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 297 (1948) (“These
patents in separate hands produced a deadlock. Lemmon by his basic patent
‘blocked’ Schultz's improvement. Cross-licenses furnished appellees a solution”).
196
U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
197
Gen. Talking Pictures v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938) (quoting
De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)). It should be
noted that an exclusive licensee receives more in addition to the promise not to sue,
namely the ability to sue others for infringement in some circumstances. See Part IC,
supra.
198
See W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir.
1930) (noting that “a license grants to the licensee merely a privilege that protects
him from a claim of infringement by the owner of the patent”); Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (noting that a licensee
with a bare license “has received only the patentee’s promise that [the licensee] will
not be sued for infringement”); U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1189 (noting that “a
nonexclusive patent license is simply a promise not to sue for infringement”).
199
Again, this is for a “bare licensee”, which is a minimum received by all
licensees, though exclusive licensees receive more rights. See Part IC, supra.
200
W. Elec. Co., 42 F.2d at 118 (noting that a patentee may freely enter
licensing agreements with others or even tolerate infringers, and in neither case
violate the rights of the patent licensee, though such actions may cause the licensee
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does the licensee have any other obligations to the patentee outside the
terms of the agreement.201
Why have courts declared that a patent license is nothing more
than a promise not to sue or a mere waiver of a right to sue? Recall
that the patentee does not have the right to use the patented invention;
rather the patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, or offering to sell the invention.202 Therefore, if the patentee
does not have the right to use the invention, then how can the patentee
grant the licensee a right to use the invention when the patentee does
not have that right themselves?
The Federal Circuit acknowledged this absurdity. Based on the
exclusionary rights granted a patentee, the Federal Circuit reasoned as
follows about the actual nature of a patent license:
Even if [a patent license is] couched in terms of
“licensee is given the right to make, use, or sell X,” the
agreement cannot convey that absolute right because
not even the patentee of X is given that right. His right
is merely one to exclude others from making, using or
selling X, 35 U.S.C. § 154. Indeed, the patentee of X
and his licensee, when making, using, or selling X, can
be subject to suit under other patents.203
Because a patentee cannot grant a right to that which it does not have,
the Federal Circuit held that “[a]s a threshold matter, a patent license

“pecuniary loss,” but “no legal injury”). This of course assumes that the terms of the
license do not require or prevent such conduct by the patentee.
201
U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1189 (noting that granting a license “does
not obligate the licensee to do anything; it simply provides the licensee with a
guarantee that it will not be sued for engaging in conduct that would infringe the
patent in question”).
202
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
203
Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert &
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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agreement is in essence nothing more than a promise by the licensor
not to sue the licensee” for patent infringement.204
With this understanding, the Federal Circuit recently declared that
a license is equivalent to a covenant not to sue.205 Even some
commentators note the implications of viewing a patent license
agreement as a covenant not to sue on other areas of the law,206 such as
the assignment of patent licenses in a bankruptcy proceeding.207
Perhaps the language of the pre-1952 statutes describing the rights
granted a patentee explains the incorrect definition of a patent license
found in the 1951 fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary.208 Another
potential reason for the inaccurate definition may be that Congress had
yet to centralize all appeals of patent cases into a single court, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Congress first created the

204

Id.; accord Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (“If the party has not received an [exclusive license] i.e., the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention, the party has a ‘bare
license,’ and has received only the patentee’s promise that that party will not be sued
for infringement”).
205
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] license is, in essence, a licensor's covenant not to sue the
licensee”); see also John C. Phillips, Note, Sui Generis Intellectual Property
Protection for Computer Software, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 997, 1041 n.212. (1992)
(“A ‘license’ in the patent law context may be defined as a covenant not to sue for
infringement in exchange for a royalty”).
206
Michelle Morgan Harner, Carl E. Black, and Eric R. Goodman, Debtors
Beware: The Expanding Universe of Non-Assumable/Non-Assignable Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 187, 211 (2005) (“[L]icense agreements
are covenants not to sue-i.e., the licensor agrees not to sue the licensee for patent
infringement if the licensee uses the patented invention and performs (such as by
paying royalties) in accordance with the terms of the license agreement”).
207
Id. at 212.
208
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (4th ed. 1951).
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982209 for the purpose of
unifying patent law210 among other things.211
Nevertheless, none of these possible reasons for an erroneous
definition of a patent license excuses the Seventh Circuit for relying
on the 1951 definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary when the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have explicated a correct
definition of a patent license.
2. A license may be retroactive.
In deciding the Waterloo case, the Seventh Circuit also relied on
the notion that a license has only prospective qualities.212 To reinforce
that notion, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly defined a patent license as
a grant to the licensee of the right to use the patented invention, which
can only be forward looking.213 However, patent licenses may have
both prospective and retrospective qualities, in part because a patent
license is in essence a promise not to sue.214 Other types of intellectual
property also recognize retroactive licensing agreements.215

209

The Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982 (FCIA) established the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant
provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
210
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838
(2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit “was created, in part, to promote uniformity
in the development [patent] law”).
211
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1989) (noting administrative
efficiency and reduced forum shopping as some other reasons).
212
Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F. 3d 641, 647
(7th Cir. 2006).
213
Id.
214
See Part IIIA1, supra.
215
See, e.g., Dov S. Greenbaum, Comment, THE DATABASE DEBATE: IN
SUPPORT OF AN INEQUITABLE SOLUTION, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 431, 515 n.160
(2003) (noting that Texaco agreed to pay a seven-figure settlement and retroactive
licensing fee to the CCC for a copyright infringement claim).
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The Federal Circuit has acknowledged on various occasions both
implicitly216 and explicitly217 that a patent license may be retroactive.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit explicitly held that “a release [from past
infringement] can, in certain circumstances, have the effect of and be
construed as a license.”218 Various district courts have also recognized
the retroactive nature of patent licenses in the form of a settlement for
past infringement.219
Moreover, most patent infringement cases settle220 with the parties
entering some form of licensing agreement.221 Settlement in a general
216

See Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(noting that Intel and HP entered into a cross-licensing agreement granting each
other “an ‘irrevocable, retroactive, nonexclusive, world-wide, royalty-free license’
under all patents and patent applications covered by the agreement”); Enzo APA &
Son v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“By its terms, the
Spidem-Geapag License is retroactive, effective as of December 4, 1992, thus
predating the first filed action”); Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135
F.3d 1456, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a patent license may cover past
infringement, although absent an agreement between co-owners, a license granted by
one co-owner and not the others will only operate prospectively).
217
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Hercules, Inc., 105 F.3d 629, 634 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (ruling that a MFL licensee was entitled to a retroactive license).
218
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th
Cir. 1973).
219
See Burlington Indus. v. Solutia, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (D. N.C.
2003) (“After reviewing the License Agreement, Settlement Agreement, and
Consent Decree, it is apparent that Plaintiff and Rossville entered into a patent
license agreement [for past use of the patented technology]”); Jacobson v. Cox
Paving Co., No. 89-1786 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17787, at *19 (D. Ariz. 1991)
(“Mr. Jacobson purchased the McDonald patents in 1986 and retroactively licensed
the infringing activities of Arizona Refining”); see also Willemijn
Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 925 F. Supp. 193, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“A licensor's grant of immunity from suit in settlement of a dispute
under a prior license agreement is ‘the equivalent of a license’ and may trigger
another licensee’s most-favored-licensee clause”), vacated on other grounds, 103
F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997).
220
Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259 (2006) (finding that about eighty percent of patent cases
settle).
221
Id. at 275.
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sense may occur before actual litigation begins or anytime
thereafter.222 Because the parties settle usually after infringement has
allegedly occurred, thus precipitating the lawsuit or the threat of
litigation, licensing agreements typically have a retroactive effective
date, and thus embrace both prospective and retrospective qualities.223
To illustrate this point further, consider the first variation of the
previous “Kate and Jon” hypothetical where Jon makes a widget
having elements A+B+C, which infringes Kate’s patent for a widget
having elements A+B. Kate has yet to file a lawsuit, but both agree
that Jon has been infringing Kate’s patent for the past 3 years and that
her patent would withstand a validity challenge. Because of the threat
of litigation, Jon and Kate, enter into a licensing agreement a week
before Kate’s patent expires although negotiations began just under a
year ago.
Jon agrees to pay a lump-sum royalty to Kate within two months
of the execution date of the agreement. The lump-sum royalty covers
Jon’s past infringing acts as well as his future use of the invention for
the remaining week left on the life of the patent. Although the
licensing agreement contains mostly retrospective features and only
marginally prospective ones, it is nevertheless a license: Kate has
promised not to sue Jon for past and future infringement in exchange
for a lump-sum royalty payment. Courts consider lump-sum royalties
222

Id. at 256-57; see also Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements,
34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 392 (2003) (“I do not distinguish between settlements that
take place after patent litigation commences and those that take place before the
filing of a patent lawsuit. Both types of settlements take place in the shadow of an
ultimate court ruling on patent validity and/or infringement”).
223
In fact, the licensing agreement between Haworth and Waterloo was
executed in December 1992 but had an effective date of October 1, 1992. Waterloo
Furniture Components v. Haworth, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 950, 952 (N.D. Ill 2005).
Thus, Waterloo paid Haworth a certain monetary amount to cover past infringing
acts that occurred prior to the execution of the licensing agreement and any future
ones up to the expiration date of the patent, a retroactive and prospective license.
See, e.g., Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 318
n.2 (1973) (Shatterproof began negotiations in 1952, which concluded in 1955 with a
license agreement having an effective date of Jan. 1, 1954); id. at 319 (In 1962,
Libbey-Owens-Ford executed a license agreement with Ford having an effective date
of Jan. 1, 1961).

829
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/13

34

Sneddon: Licensee Beware: The Seventh Circuit Holds That a Patent License

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 2

Spring 2007

the same as continuing royalty payments in that they fulfill the
licensee’s obligation to pay the patentee for the license.224
Consider the legal effects, if any, on the outcome when the facts
of the hypothetical are altered. In this variation, the negotiation
process took longer and an agreement was reached a week after the
patent expired, but all the other terms were the same. Now the
licensing agreement contains only retrospective features. Despite the
patent’s expiration, the agreement is still a patent license: Kate has
promised not to sue Jon for past infringement in exchange for a lumpsum royalty fee. A patentee’s authority to grant a retroactive patent
license is what enables the settlement of a patent infringement suit and
is indistinguishable from a settlement.225
3. Expired patents retain some value to the patentee.
The Seventh Circuit also incorrectly implied that once a patent
expires, the patentee can no longer enforce his patent rights based on
the expired patent, bolstering its claim that a license has only
prospective qualities.226 While the patentee’s power to exclude others
no longer exists after a patent’s expiration,227 “a patent does have

224

Hazeltine Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 100 F.2d 10, 16 (7th Cir. 1938)
(“‘Royalty,’ when used in connection with a license under a patent, means the
compensation paid by the licensee to the licensor for the use of the licensor's
patented invention”); see Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Hercules, Inc., 105
F.3d 629, 633 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The ordinary meaning of the term ‘paying licensee’
is one who gives money for a license . . . we see no distinction between one who
makes an up-front, lump-sum payment and one who makes continuing royalty
payments. Indeed, such a distinction would be doubly doubtful because a ‘paid-up’
license presumably includes potential future royalty payments discounted to their net
present value”).
225
See De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241-42, (1927)
(settlement and license have the same legal effect); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th Cir. 1973) (settlement may be
deemed equivalent to a retroactive license).
226
Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F. 3d 641, 64748 (7th Cir. 2006).
227
35 U.S.C § 154(a)(2) (2006).
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value beyond its expiration date.”228 By statute, a patentee may still
sue an infringer for past infringement committed during the life of the
patent.229
A patentee may still recover standard remedies when suing for
past infringement of an expired patent. For example, a patentee whose
right to exclude expired with the patent may yet be able to obtain postpatent-expiration injunctions.230 A patentee may want to seek an
injunction after a patent has expired for two basic reasons. First, a
patentee may request the injunctions to destroy infringing items made
during the patent’s lifetime or “articles made from an infringing
machine or process.”231 Another reason for a post-expiration
injunction is to enjoin the infringer “from making the patented item for
the amount of time it would take for the infringer to recreate the
invention after the patent expired.”232
Injunctions are not the only remedy available to a patentee after a
patent expires. A patentee may recover money damages as well.233
Although sometimes misunderstood as a statute of limitations,234
§ 286 caps the amount of damages a patentee may recover from an
infringer for any infringement committed more than six years prior to
filing the lawsuit.235 In other words, “one starts from the filing of a
[patent-infringement lawsuit] and counts backward [six years] to
228

In re Morgan, 990 F.2d 1230, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000); accord In re Morgan, 990 F.2d at 1232. (tersely
noting that “a patent may be sued on after it expires”).
230
See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Note, Post-Expiration Patent
Injunctions, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105 (1998).
231
Id. at 106-07.
232
Id. (This is because if the infringer had respected the patentee’s rights, they
would not be able to recreate the invention until after the patent expires. In other
words, by infringing the patent, the infringer received an unlawful head start on
recreating the invention for lawful use after patent expiration. A post-expiration
injunction would deprive the infringer of that head start).
233
See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000).
234
Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 754 F.2d 345,
348 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
235
35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery
shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of
the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action”).
229
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determine the date before which [the patentee may no longer recover
damages].”236
A patentee may therefore still derive value from an expired patent
either by commencing a law suit or seeking a licensing agreement with
the alleged infringer up to six years after the patent expired.237
Remember, this is not an unlawful extension of the patent term
because the patentee may not recover damages for use of the patented
invention after the patent expires.238 Rather, if a patentee first
discovers after the patent expired that an infringer committed
infringing acts before the patent’s expiration, the patentee may recover
those damages.
Logically then, a patentee can resolve any patent dispute with an
infringer after the patent has expired by either entering a licensing or
settlement agreement covering the past infringing acts. The infringer’s
ability to enter into retroactive agreements confirms the notion that
settlement agreements may be considered a licensing agreement, even
if the patent has expired, and especially if a MFL clause is implicated.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit erroneously concluded that a patent
license has only prospective qualities. In reality, the legal effect of a
license, a promise not to sue, may cover both past and future
infringing acts in exchange for an agreed upon consideration.
B. Ignoring De Forest for the Trees and
Disregarding the Federal Circuit
In the second misstep, the court arguably ignored the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the legal effects of a patent license and should have
been more deferential to the Federal Circuit, the court Congress
especially created to determine patent issues and bring uniformity to
patent laws.239
236

Standard Oil Co., 754 F.2d at 348.
See, e.g., In re Morgan, 990 F.2d 1230, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
238
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
239
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838
(2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit “was created, in part, to promote uniformity
in the development [patent] law”).
237
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The Seventh Circuit should have looked to the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit for the correct definition of a patent license. The
Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that a license in the
context of patent law “amounts to no more than ‘a mere waiver of the
right to sue.’”240 In De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v United States,241
the pre-eminent Supreme Court case explaining the meaning of a
patent license, the American Telephone Company released the United
States and “all manufactures acting under its orders” from any
infringement claims stemming from the United States’ use and
manufacture of a patented invention for use in World War I.242
The De Forest Radio Telephone Company, the holder of patents
for the invention, later sued the United States for infringement.243
However, De Forest granted certain rights in the patent to Western
Electric Company, who subsequently conveyed the rights to the
American Telephone Company.244 The agreement included the right of
De Forest and Western Electric to sue others for any of the patents
“within the fields in which each respectively possessed rights,” 245 and
to license to the United States use of the patented technology.246 A
license would serve as a complete defense to claims of patent
infringement by either company.247
In holding that American Telephone Company’s actions created an
implied license with the United States Government,248 the Court also
explicated the nature of a patent license. The Court noted, “No formal
granting of a license is necessary in order to give it effect.”249

240

Gen. Talking Pictures v. West. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938) (quoting
De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)).
241
273 U.S. 236 (1927).
242
Id. at 239-40.
243
Id. at 237.
244
Id. at 238.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 240.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 242.
249
Id. at 241.
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Moreover, the court approvingly quoted an earlier Supreme Court case
that declared a license is “a mere waiver of the right to sue.”250
The Federal Circuit stands with the Supreme Court in its case law,
when explicating the nature of a patent license.251 Although Federal
Circuit decisions do not bind the Seventh Circuit,252 even in matters of
patent law,253 the Seventh Circuit should give deference to the Federal
Circuit in matters implicating patent law,254 similar to the manner in
which the Federal Circuit defers to its sister appellate courts when
deciding matters not implicating patent law, such as procedural issues
and substantive issues not involving patent law.255
One commentator argued for deference to the Federal Circuit
while recognizing that the Federal Circuit’s decisions do not bind
regional appellate and state courts, in this manner:
The most obvious law for the regional appellate courts
and state courts to apply to patent issues is that of the
Federal Circuit. However, federal appellate courts are
250

Id. at 242 (quoting Henry v. Dick Co. 224 U.S. 1, 24 (1912)).
See generally Part IIIA1, supra.
252
Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.
dissenting).
253
See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th
Cir. 1989).
254
But see Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving
Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit,
92 GEO. L.J. 523, 526 (“Generally, however, federal courts of appeals follow what
can be called the ‘rule of no deference,’ which allows courts to treat the decisions of
coordinate federal courts as persuasive, but prohibits deference to them”).
255
One commentator summarized the Federal Circuit’s deference as follows:
[The Federal Circuit] applies regional circuit law to procedural
issues that are not themselves substantive patent law issues so long
as they do not (1) pertain to patent law, (2) bear an essential
relationship to matters committed to [the court’s] exclusive control
by statute, or (3) clearly implicate the jurisprudential
responsibilities of [the court] in a field within its exclusive
jurisdiction.
Sean M. McEldowney, Comment, The “Essential Relationship” Spectrum: A
Framework For Addressing Choice of Procedural Law In The Federal Circuit, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1668 (2000).
251
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not bound by Federal Circuit law and do not have
sovereignty-based reasons for following it, as they do
with state law. Therefore, the basis for their deference
to Federal Circuit law should come from three places.
First, it generally is more efficient for regional circuits
to follow the Federal Circuit so the appellate courts do
not need to develop new law. Second, the courts should
respect the congressional purpose of creating a uniform
body of patent law. Finally and most tenuously, the
regional circuits should honor Federal Circuit law to
promote comity among the circuit courts, which the
Federal Circuit has, at least in principle, supported.
Perhaps such respect for the Federal Circuit law will
generate a reciprocal respect in the Federal Circuit for
regional circuit law, transforming its purported
adherence to regional circuit law on nonpatent issues
into actual adherence.256
However, what about issues before the courts that involve matters
of both patent law and other areas of law, or issues that merely
implicate patent law? For instance, some decisions that may have a
“substantial effect on patent law” involve antitrust, contracts,
copyrights, federal business law tort claims such as trade dress
infringement, patent licensing disputes, and state law business
disparagement claims.257 In those cases that implicate patent law or
involve matters of patent law, other regional appellate and state courts
should defer to the Federal Circuit in order to promote the
congressional intent of a uniform body of patent law.258
256

Ravi V. Sitwala, Note, In Defense of Holmes v. Vornado: Addressing The
Unwarranted Criticism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 452, 477 (2004).
257
Scott Cole, Note and Comment, The Rise And Fall Of Patent Law
Uniformity And The Need For Congressional Response, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 713,
725-26 (2006).
258
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838
(2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit “was created, in part, to promote uniformity
in the development [patent] law”); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (“The need for uniformity in
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Other regional appellate courts have understood the need for a
uniform body of patent law, and have deferred to the Federal Circuit
precedent when deciding issues implicating patent law. For example,
the Ninth Circuit, in a bankruptcy proceeding, upheld the district
court’s decision, preventing the assignability of a patent license by the
debtor.259 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit looked to federal patent law,
as promulgated by the Federal Circuit court, to govern its decision,
even though federal patent law may have conflicted with California
state law.260
The court justified their conclusion by emphasizing the
importance of federal patent policy and a uniform rule of “modern
federal decision” regarding the non-assignability of nonexclusive
patent licenses.261 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit cited Seventh Circuit
precedent that also held that federal patent law governed the
assignability of a patent license,262 which means the Seventh Circuit
not only understands this principle but even applied it and
incorporated it into its own case law. Notably, the Ninth Circuit also
looked to the Supreme Court’s De Forest decision for a definition of a
patent license, 263 which definition the Federal Circuit case law
supports.264
In order to follow the Congressional directive for a uniform body
of patent law, the Seventh Circuit should have followed the Ninth
Circuit’s example and looked to the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit to inform its definition of a patent license, a key part of their
the construction of patent law is undoubtedly important”); Cole, supra note 257, at
725-26.
259
In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 1996)
260
Id. at 677-79.
261
Id. at 679-80.
262
Id. at 677-78 (citing Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972)
(“The question of assignability of a patent license is a specific policy of federal
patent law dealing with federal patent law. Therefore, we hold federal law applies to
the question of the assignability of the patent license in question”)).
263
Id. at 677 (noting that a patent license is a “‘mere waiver of the right to sue’
the licensee for infringement”) (quoting De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States,
273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)).
264
See Part IIIA1, supra.
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reasoning to hold that a settlement agreement may never be a patent
license.265
C. The calculations for a payment of royalties in a license agreement
and a settlement agreement are substantially the same.
Third and finally, the Seventh Circuit ignored the actual
negotiation process and legal effects of both a licensing agreement and
a settlement agreement for patent infringement. Instead, the Seventh
Circuit focused on the label of an agreement ending disputes
negotiated under threat of litigation or actual litigation and not its
substance.266
The Seventh Circuit overlooked the fact that a calculation of
royalty rates267 for a licensing agreement and a settlement agreement
mimic each other, thus bolstering the notion that settlement
agreements perform substantially the same function as licensing
agreements—in other words, a means for the parties to enter some
form of a covenant not to sue in exchange for an agreed upon
consideration.268

265

Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F. 3d 641, 647
(7th Cir. 2006).
266
Id. at 647-48.
267
Royalty as used here means any compensation paid to the licensor for a
license, See Hazeltine Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 100 F.2d 10, 16.(7th Cir. 1938)
(“‘Royalty’ when used in connection with a license under a patent, means the
compensation paid by the licensee to the licensor for the use of the licensor’s
patented invention”)).
268
See, e.g., Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d
1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] license is, in essence, a licensor's covenant not to
sue the licensee”); see also John C. Phillips, Note, Sui Generis Intellectual Property
Protection for Computer Software, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 997, 1041 n.212 (1992)
(“A ‘license’ in the patent law context may be defined as a covenant not to sue for
infringement in exchange for a royalty”). For a settlement as a covenant not to sue,
see, e.g., Microchip Tech. Inc. v. Chamberlain Group, 441 F.3d 936, 942 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (noting that the parties’ settlement agreement was a covenant not to sue).
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Because damages for patent infringement are calculated using lost
profits or a reasonable royalty rate, and sometimes both,269 settlement
amounts will, in large part, be based on either lost profits or a
reasonable royalty rate.270 Thus, a settlement based on the reasonable
royalty rate mimics the negotiation process the parties would have had
if they instead entered into a licensing agreement.271
When a court determines damages for past patent infringement
employing a reasonable royalty calculation, it conjures up what royalty
rate the parties hypothetically would have agreed to if they sat across
the bargaining table on the day infringement began and had instead
entered into a license agreement.272 In other words, if the parties had
negotiated a license agreement on the day infringement began, the
royalty rate the patentee would have charged the infringer for use of
the invention is the same rate calculation that the court would use to
assess the amount of damages the infringer owes the patentee.
The actions of the parties in negotiating a royalty rate for a license
or a settlement agreement has the same legal effect, as the Supreme
269

35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d
1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The [damages] award may be split between lost
profits as actual damages to the extent they are proven and a reasonable royalty for
the remainder”).
270
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 222, at 392 (“Virtually every patent license
can be viewed as a settlement of a patent dispute: the royalty rate presumably
reflects the two parties’ strengths or weaknesses in patent litigation in conjunction
with the licensee’s ability to invent around the patent”).
271
Kesan & Ball, supra note 220, at 254 (“Obviously, an out-of-court
negotiation of a licensing agreement is similar to a negotiation of a settlement
agreement once the case has been filed”); see also Shapiro, supra note 222, at 392
(“I do not distinguish between settlements that take place after patent litigation
commences and those that take place before the filing of a patent lawsuit. Both types
of settlements take place in the shadow of an ultimate court ruling on patent validity
and/or infringement”).
272
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“Hypothetical negotiations should be the result of supposed meeting between the
patentee and the infringer at the time infringement began”); accord Unisplay S.a. v.
Am. Elec. Sign Co., Inc., 69 F.3d 512, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The key element in
setting a reasonably royalty is the need to return to the date when the infringement
began”).
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Court’s De Forest case supports.273 As a commentator put it, “royalties
simply force the patentee to issue a retroactive license.”274
Recognizing that similar tactics, processes, and legal outcomes
accompany license agreement and settlement agreement negotiations
led one firm to advertise their skills in “Adversarial Patent Licensing
Negotiations,” concluding that “adversarial patent licensing
negotiations had many of the same qualities as settlement of pending
litigation.” 275
Because a settlement agreement and a license agreement are
largely based on the same royalty rate calculations and result in the
same legal effect, a settlement agreement should be considered a
license.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RULING
Legal issues surrounding intellectual property continue to increase
in importance and national attention,276 especially as intellectual
property becomes an increasingly larger portion of a company’s assets,
and by extension a nation’s economy.277 For example, some
commentators note patent law’s newfound stature, due to the Supreme
Court’s recent zeal to grant writs of certiorari in patent cases decided
at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.278 In 2006 alone, the

273

See, e.g., De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241-42
(1927) (release and license have the same legal effect).
274
Mohamed Yusuf M. Mohamed, Note, Unjust Enrichment for Patent
Infringement: A Novel Idea, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 123, 127 (1997).
275
See “Adversarial Patent Licensing Negotiations” found at
http://www.mofo.com/practice/practice/intellectualproperty/adversarial/overview.ht
ml. (last visited April 16, 2007).
276
Jess Bravin, Battleground Shifts to High Court, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006,
at A1.
277
A. Tracy Gomes and Thomas George, Patent Value Continues to Soar in
2005, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, February/March 2006, at 34.
278
Harold C. Wegner, Top Ten Supreme Court Patent Cases, Mar. 9, 2006, p.
3-4; available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/SupremeCourtMARCH9.pdf
(last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
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high court has granted certiorari in six patent cases, “more cases in a
single year than any [year] since the 1960s.”279
Compare that number to the period just after the mid twentieth
century: “[During] the next three decades, the Court averaged barely
one patent decision per year, or less than one-third its average from the
first half of the [twentieth] century.”280 Consider the high court’s
patent caseload even more recently. Since the 1982 inception of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, during “the twelve terms
between 1983 and 1994 (inclusive), the Court heard five patent
cases.”281 No wonder a commentator declared in 2001 “[t]he Supreme
Court has rendered itself well nigh invisible in modern substantive
patent law.”282 The Supreme Court has reasserted its influence in
patent law, given the recent uptick in patent cases heard by the Court,
as evidenced in the previous five terms283 and the current term.284

279

Brian Prince, U.S. Supreme Court Ponders Patent Rules, eWeek, Nov. 28,
2006, available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2065019,00.asp, (last
visited Apr. 16, 2007).
280
John R. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to
the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275. For a more detailed discussion of
the frequency with which the Supreme Court heard patent cases over the past two
centuries, see id. at 285-301.
281
Id. at 297.
282
Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (2001).
283
Three cases during the 2001-2002 term: J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer HiBred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124 (2001), Holmes Group Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., 535 U.S. 826 (2002), and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); no cases during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 terms; one
case during the 2004-2005 term: Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193 (2005); four cases during the 2005-2006 term: Unitherm Food Sys. v.
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006), Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28 (2006), Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct.
2921 (2006), eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
284
Three cases during the 2006-2007 term: MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007), KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007),
and Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
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Given this backdrop, licensing of patented technology will
likewise increase in importance,285 especially because of the Court’s
recent decision in eBay v. MercExchange,286 where the Court
eliminated the usual rule that a finding of patent infringement entitles
the patentee to a permanent injunction.287 Because a court will no
longer grant a permanent injunction to a patentee as a matter of course
after proving infringement, the parties may be more inclined to enter
licensing agreements for the technology covered by the disputed
patents.288 Or, perhaps more worrisome to unwilling patent holders,
the parties could even be forced to enter a license agreement as part of
a court’s judgment.289
Given the likelihood of increased emphasis placed on patent
license agreements, the Seventh Circuit created a general rule that was
not really well thought out. For example, under the new rule, a
patentee could undermine the purpose of a MFL clause by entering a
285

A. Tracy Gomes and Thomas George, Patent Value Continues to Soar in
2005, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, February/March 2006, at 34-35 (noting
in 2005 $300-$500 million in patent litigation settlements, a $1.35 billion verdict,
and a $525 future royalty payment buyout: “With patent applications up, patent
awards/settlements up and more individuals, assertion companies and corporations
asserting their IP rights, it is hard to imagine the future being anything other than
more of the same). Compare those amounts with the recent record setting $1.52
billion verdict in the Lucent v. Microsoft cases discussed in Saul Hansell, MP3
Patents in Upheaval After Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at C1.
286
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
287
Id. at 1841.
288
Patently-O Patent Law Blog,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/supreme_court_v.html, (last visited Apr.
16, 2007) (“Because the industry competitor has a higher likelihood of obtaining an
injunction, it should be willing to pay more for the patent. Interestingly, this
valuation gap may spur more licenses and patent transfers”); but see Yixin H. Tang,
Note, The Future of Patent Development After eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 235, 250 (2006) (“[Large] corporations now have even less financial
incentive to license from non-practicing patent owners”).
289
This is commonly termed a compulsory license. In the post-eBay world
where permanent injunctions are no longer a matter of course after a finding of
patent infringement, a district court has already granted a compulsory license:
Finisar Corp. v. DIRECTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76380, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006).
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settlement agreement at a lower royalty rate with the MFL licensee’s
competitor during the course of a patent infringement suit. The
patentee may worry that its patent will be found invalid if litigation
continues, and therefore seek to avoid this outcome by inducing the
MFL licensee’s competitor to accept a settlement at a lower royalty
rate than the rate offered the MFL licensee. Under the Seventh
Circuit’s new holding, the MFL licensee has no recourse to prevent
this outcome.
At a minimum, a settlement agreement should be considered a
license agreement for cases implicating a “most favored licensee”
status.290 An exception to the Seventh Circuit’s general rule, at least in
the case of MFL licensees, would prevent collusion between the
patentee and the MFL licensee’s competitor from undermining the
MFL clause. The outcome of the Waterloo case may have been correct
assuming the court correctly interpreted the terms of the contract291 but
the court should not have created a rubric that will govern other
dissimilar circumstances.
What can patent practitioners do to take into account the effects of
the Seventh Circuit’s Waterloo ruling when drafting license
agreements in the future? Practitioners may want to explicitly contain
language in a MFL clause to not only include that a MFL licensee is
entitled to a more favorably rate granted in a future license agreement,
but also more favorable rates agreed to during any settlement of patent
infringement disputes covering the same technology outlined in the
MFL license agreement. Alternatively, practitioners may not want to

290

See Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp.,
925 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“To conclude [that a settlement for prior
patent infringement is not a license] would allow Willemijn to eviscerate the effect
of SMC's most-favored-licensee clause by, for example, ‘requiring’ a subsequent
licensee to pay a higher royalty rate and then waiving the right to sue for all or part
of that rate), vacated, Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard
Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997).
291
Waterloo Furniture Components Ltd. v. Haworth, Inc., 467 F. 3d 641, 64546 (7th Cir. 2006) (The court held that the license agreement expired based on the
contract’s terms, meaning Haworth had no more obligations to Waterloo at the time
Haworth and SoftView entered the agreement).
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label the agreement a license at all, but instead a “covenant not to
sue.”
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit put a “most favored licensee” at a
competitive disadvantage with other potential licensees. The court
created a general rule that settlement agreements are not patent
licenses when the patent has expired. To support the new ruling, the
court reasoned from an incorrect understanding of what constitutes a
patent license and its associated prospective and retrospective
qualities. The Seventh Circuit should have given more deference to the
Federal Circuit in patent law issues and those cases that implicate
substantive patent law. The court focused instead on the label attached
to an agreement and not the processes by which the agreement is
reached nor its legal effects.
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